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KEEPING EMPLOYEES' TRUST: THE
ROCKY ROAD AHEAD FOR PENSION PLAN
TRUSTEES
NIKOLAY

A. OUZOUNOV*

1
Trustees are guardians of the future against claims of the present.

INTRODUCTION

It is not comforting to know that the average chief financial
officer in the United States spends about three percent of her time
managing her company's retirement accounts. 2 Things become
even more troublesome when one considers that the liquidated
value of a company's retirement accounts often exceeds the
liquidated value of the company's total assets. 3 Recent corporate
turmoil, including the facts surrounding the demise of Enron and
4
its employee retirement plans, continues to be widely debated.
Enron, however, was not a faceless behemoth. Observers
5
quickly focused the spotlight on Enron's pension plans trustees.
.

J.D. Candidate, June 2004. I would like to thank the John Marshall
Law Review Board for their patience and professionalism. I would also like to
thank Tadd M. Johnson and Bob Rowe for their ideas, guidance, and expertise.
Special thanks to my family in Bulgaria for their unwavering support
throughout my law school career.
1. James Tobin, What Is Permanent Endowment Income, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 433, 434 (1974). Professor Tobin was a Sterling Professor of Economics
at Yale University. For his extensive contribution to the field, Professor Tobin
won a Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1981. More information on
Professor Tobin is available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/faculty/tobin.htm.
(last visited Mar. 20, 2004).
2. Interview with Robert Rowe Jr., Founder, Rowe Decision Analytics,
Chicago, Ill. (Sept. 1, 2002).
3. Id. See also Peter Hancock & Roberto Mendoza, Risk and Transparency
in Pensions: Roberto Mendoza and Peter Hancock Applaud UK Accounting
Changes That Bring Transparency to Company Liabilities, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
20, 2002, at 29 (commenting that defined benefit plan assets can be "a
multiple of the company's market capitalization").
4. CNN's popular program Moneyline featured a daily update on the
"Enron corporate America
charges brought against Enron Corporation.
available at http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/
criminal scoreboard,"
moneyline/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
5. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Labor Dept. Questions Enron's Truthfulness, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2002, Sec. C, at 1. Oppel comments that the officers who
served as pension plan trustees had information about Enron's financial
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Feeling pressure from the Labor Department, Enron ousted its
trustees and turned control of the pension plans over to the State
Street Corporation. 6 Enron hardly provides the only example of
trustee plan mismanagement. 7 Recent developments have led
industry experts to believe that plan trustees, and especially
trustees in charge of smaller plans, are often ill-equipped to meet
their responsibilities.8 Such concerns lead to the belief that we are
standing on the threshold of numerous lawsuits for fiduciary
breach by pension plan trustees. 9
Congress has considered various legislative solutions targeted
to bring a sense of security to employees in the wake of losses
suffered by pension plans.10
Some commentators, though,
acknowledge the somewhat contradictory nature of the proposed

hardships, but failed to act to protect employees' investments. Id. The value
of the 401(k) plan held by Enron employees subsequently fell by more than
sixty percent because the employees were primarily invested in Enron stock.
Id.
6. Id. Enron switched to State Street after the Labor Department
threatened a lawsuit to oust Enron's trustees. Marisa Rogoway, Proposed
Reforms to the Regulation of 401(k)Plans in the Wake of the Enron Disaster,6
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 423, 424 (2002). The Enron saga is rather
telling. After Enron filed for bankruptcy, the price of Enron stock plunged,
and in February 2002 it was less than a dollar per share. Id. According to the
author's research, Enron employees lost an estimate of one billion dollars in
savings; these funds were mostly held in 401(k) plans. Id.
7. See Kathy Chen, Are 401(k)-Plan Trustees Not Up to the Job, WALL ST.
J., May 29, 2002, at C1 (noting that Seagen Pharmaceuticals President and
trustee of its 401(k) plan withheld worker's contributions and used them to
pay salaries, that union pension plan trustees imprudently invested plan
money with an investment-management firm which at the time was under
investigation for engaging in pyramid schemes, and that First Union settled
two lawsuits for alleged trustee's violations due to inadequate education). The
author also discusses several other cases in which a trustee's lack of sufficient
investment knowledge created serious problems. Id.
8. Id. The article comments on some troublesome practices. For example,
many trustees are without a financial background, but instead are volunteers
or people chosen because of their popularity within the company. Id. As a
result, trustees are often involved in various conflicts of interest, and fail to
properly fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities to plan beneficiaries. Id.
9. Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 469, 470 (2001). Professor Medill voices a concern that baby
boomers, soon to be retirees, may initiate a wave of litigation when they
realize that they do not have enough savings to retire. Id. Such litigation
would "eventually dwarf tobacco, firearms and other product liability
litigation." Id. Of special concern is the fact that, for many employees, much
of the security of their retirement is dependent on the performance of their
employer-sponsored 401(k) plans. Id.
10. Congress considered several pieces of proposed legislation, including the
Retirement Security Advice Act of 2002, S. 1978, 107th Cong. (2002); the
Pension Protection and Diversification Act of 2001, S. 1838, 107th Cong.
(2001); and the Independent Investment Advice Act of 2001, S. 1677, 107th
Cong. (2001).
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legislation."
To many present fiduciaries, as well as plan
participants and beneficiaries, such observations add to the
12
already complex and confusing situation.
This Comment argues that although existing law, specifically
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), has defined various responsibilities for plan trustees,
the law has insufficient provisions for plan trustees' education and
expertise. 13
Such deficiencies are ultimately detrimental to
pension plans, 14 their participants, and their beneficiaries. A
higher standard of trustee accountability, together with adequate

levels of trustee education, with an emphasis on the full scope of
trustee responsibilities, are needed to better safeguard pension
11. Albert B. Crenshaw, Panel Approves Pension Bill; Senate Committee
Plan Could Clash With House Bill, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2002, at EO1.
Crenshaw comments that the House and the Senate have worked
independently on packages of retirement plan changes. Id. He points out that
"if both measures are passed by their respective chambers in their current
forms, the stage will be set for a tough ideological conflict when a conference
committee seeks to meld them." Id. One difference between the packages is
that the Senate bill calls for inclusion of workers as trustees of the retirement
plans at large companies, while the House bill has no such requirement. Id.
12. Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and
Investment Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice? 23 BERKLEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 18 (2002). Muir writes, "both behavioral economics theory
and plan investment data indicate that individual employees face numerous
challenges in making investment allocation decisions." Id.
This problem,
according to the author, is further intensified by employers' fears that by
providing investment advice, the employer becomes a possible target of a
breach of fiduciary duty suit. Id. at 50. See also Testimony of David Certner
(pointing out that even before the recent events, too many investors lacked the
time and knowledge and to sort through the huge quantities of available
information, and make an intelligent decision), at http://www.house.gov/
edworkforce/hearings/106th/eer/erisa3lOOO/certner.htm. (last visited Mar. 4,
2004).
13. Chen, supra note 7, at C1. Chen points out that ERISA does not
require pension plan trustees to have any investment expertise. Id. Such a
low threshold for plan trustees allows any volunteer, regardless of her
knowledge in investments, to become a trustee. Id.
14. Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined ContributionPlans,
4 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 610-12 (2000). Pension plans are generally divided into
two separate categories: defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans.
Id. The main difference is in the structure of the two plans. Id. A defined
benefit plan "pools assets" in an aggregate trust and promises to pay a fixed
amount to plan participants once they retire. Id. The amount of money is not
dependant on investment performance. Id. A defined contribution plan differs
in its lack of an aggregate trust that pools assets.
Id.
With defined
contribution plans, every participant has an individual account. Id. When the
participant retires she receives the entire account balance. Id. Whether the
employee will have sufficient funds for her retirement depends on the
investment performance of her plan. Id. With the defined benefit plan, it is
the employer who is liable if the employee has insufficient funds at retirement;
in a defined contribution plan, where the employee has investment control, the
participant bears this risk. Id.
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plan assets.
Part I of this Comment gives an overview of ERISA as it
pertains to retirement plan trustees. This Part will focus on (1)
the fiduciaries designated by ERISA, (2) the fiduciary duties
created by ERISA, (3) the penalties for failure to meet fiduciary
duties prescribed by ERISA, and (4) ERISA's relevance to pension
plan trustees. Part II of this Comment analyzes trustees' frequent
lack of knowledge regarding investments, and the resulting
detrimental effect on pension plan assets. Part III proposes some
possible solutions, specifically that ERISA should require that
trustees (1) possess sufficient information about their duties as
fiduciaries, and (2) have a minimum level of investment
knowledge that would enable them to oversee plan assets and the
actions of investment advisors.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE ORIGINS OF TRUSTEE DUTIES UNDER

ERISA

ERISA was enacted to protect plan participants and
beneficiaries from mismanagement of funds and employer abuse. 15
ERISA's objective was to ensure that sufficient funds were
available for payment of promised pension plan benefits.' 6 ERISA
also provided that plan participants must be given sufficient
information about their employee benefit plans, 17 and created a set
of responsibilities for plan trustees "by establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee

15. 29 U.S.C § 1001(a) (2000). The United States Supreme Court in Varity
Corp. v. Howe explained that the purpose of ERISA is to protect "employee
pensions and other benefits by providing insurance ... specifying certain plan
characteristics in detail ... and by setting forth certain general fiduciary
duties." 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996). See also Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to
Choose Unwisely: Congress' Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan
Participantsto Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLY 361, 366
(2002) (giving a detailed account of the policy and considerations behind
ERISA). Stabile states that the need for protection from employer abuse is in
its essence protection from employer overreaching. Id. Because employees
have weaker bargaining power they need protection from the "opportunistic
behavior" of a party with superior bargaining power. Id.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). This section enumerates a long list of general
policy considerations, some of which state that until the enactment of ERISA
many employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated
retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans;
that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the
soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay
promised benefits may be endangered; that.., employees and their
beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits.
Id.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000). ERISA states that its purpose is to protect
"the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries,
by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of
financial and other information." Id.
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benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies."18
A. Who Bears the Burden of FiduciaryResponsibility?
ERISA does not specifically describe the roles of pension plan
trustees. 19 However, ERISA clearly describes what parties are to
act as fiduciaries, and what their roles are.20 ERISA designates as
plan fiduciaries parties who exercise "discretionary control" with
respect to management of the plan or exercise "any authority or
2
control respecting management or disposition of its assets." '
Paid investment advisors are the clearest example of plan
fiduciaries. 22 Employers who provide investment information and
education that amounts to investment advice can also be
designated as fiduciaries. 23 The law allows an employer who hires
a professional investment advisor to delegate his fiduciary duty for
making investment decisions to the advisor.24 The employer,
however, "retains fiduciary liability for the selection and
25
monitoring of the investment manager."

18. Id. See also Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 496 (noting that ERISA serves its
purpose by creating a set of "general fiduciary duties applicable to the
management of both pension and nonpension benefit plans").
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000) (containing definitions of the terminology
used in the statute).
20. See id. § 1002(21) (listing the requirements that create a fiduciary
relationship and subsequent duties).
21. Id. § 1002(21)(A)(i). The statute also designates as fiduciary a party
that "renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any
authority or responsibility to do so." Id. § 1002(21)(A)(ii).
22. Id. § 1002(21). Investment advisors who receive compensation for their
services will fall under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) as parties that render investment
advice for a fee. Id.
23. See Muir, supra note 12, at 3 (arguing that current law discourages
employers from providing individual employees who manage their accounts
with investment advice). This anomaly is due to the distinction between
investment education and investment advice. Id. Employers are reluctant to
engage in "investment advice" and become fiduciaries and thus subject
themselves to potential liability to the plan participants and beneficiaries. Id.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. The reasoning behind the rule is that even when the employer has
selected an investment advisor, the employer retains his status as fiduciary
because he exercises control in the process of selection of the advisor and
oversees the performance of the investment advisor. See Stabile, supra note
15, at 364 (arguing that even with 401(k) plans, an employer has sufficient
control over the choices of the plan participants). Professor Stabile relies on
behavioral theorists to establish that although 401(k) plan participants
seemingly make their own investment decisions, "the actual choices presented
and how those choices are presented has a tremendous impact on participant
decision-making." Id.
The author concludes that the effect of contextdependence is that plan-participant "control" is illusory. Id. at 363.
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B. What are the Trustees'Dutiesunder ERISA?
The trustees' duties under ERISA are rooted in the state
common law of trusts. 26 The heart of trustee duty is the concept of
prudence, a requirement that can be traced back to the seminal
case of Harvard College v. Amory. 27 The Amory Court stated that
trustees should "observe how men of prudence, discretion and
intelligence manage

their own affairs ...

in regard to the

permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable
income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be
invested."28 This language was codified in the Model Prudent Man
Rule Statute. 29 Later, a similar standard of prudence, the
"Prudent man standard of care," was written into the statutory
language of ERISA. 3° Most recently, this reasonable person
standard was placed in the heart of the Uniform Prudent
Investment Act of 1995. 31
Apart from the reasonable person standard, ERISA imposes
additional duties on plan trustees. These duties include the duty
to act "solely in the interest of the [plan] participants and

26. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 496 (stating that "we recognize that these
fiduciary duties draw much of their content from the common law of trusts,
the law that governed most benefit plans before ERISA's enactment."). The
Court quotes its ruling in Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985), stating that
instead of explicitly enumerating the powers and duties of trustees, Congress
relied on the common law of trusts to establish the boundaries of trustee
responsibilities. Id. See also Jefferson, supra note 14, at 620-21 (stating that
state common law of trusts and the Internal Revenue Code was used to govern
trustee conduct before adoption of ERISA in 1974).
27. See Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830)
(articulating the prudent man standard).
28. Id. at 461.
29. For a more detailed discussion, see infra notes 30 and 31, and
corresponding text.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000). ERISA provides that
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and ... with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity ... would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims ....
Id.
31. UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT § 1 (1995). The Uniform Prudent Investor Act
addresses some of the most painful problems facing pension plan trustees.
The Act defines the prudent man rule as it applies to investments. Id. § 1.
Even more importantly, the Act focuses on the trustee's standard of care, the
establishment of overall investment strategy and other relevant
considerations (economic conditions, the effect of inflation, tax considerations,
how each investment fits within the overall trust portfolio, expected return,
etc.). Id. § 2. The Act also dedicates a whole section to diversification, closely
following the diversification requirement in the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts as well as ERISA. Id. § 3.
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beneficiaries," 32 as well as the duty to act with the "exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries." 33 Plan trustees also have a duty to diversify plan
investments in order to minimize potential losses due to
unfavorable market conditions. 34 This Comment will specifically
address diversification of assets because of its importance to
pension plans' financial health. 35 Finally, ERISA also requires
that "no fiduciary may maintain the indicia of ownership of any
assets of a plan outside the jurisdiction of the district courts of the
36
United States."
C. Liability for Failureto Comply with ERISA Standards

ERISA prescribes liability for failure to live up to the
standards set forth in section 404.37
In addition, ERISA
establishes a set of prohibited transactions, which, if undertaken,
create a presumption that the fiduciary is not acting in the best
interest of the plan. 38 These prohibited transactions fall into two
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000). Plan fiduciaries must strictly abide by
the provisions set in the plan documents, as well as inform plan participants
and beneficiaries of material facts which may notify them of potential risks in
the plan. Rogoway, supra note 6, at 425. Professor Medill takes a closer look
at the fiduciary duties of loyalty, prudence, and diversification in relation to
401(k) plans specifically. Medill, supra note 9, at 476. Of peculiar interest is
her observation that the duty of diversification creates an obstacle to
participant directed investments such as 401(k) plans. Id. Because 401(k)
plans allow employees to have a voice in how their retirement funds are
invested, participants often do not select a diversified range of investments.
Id.
33. ERISA § 404; 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000); see also Susan J.
Stabile, Breach of ERISA FiduciaryResponsibilities: Who is liable anyway? 5
EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 135, 138-39 (2001) (discussing the general

standards of fiduciary responsibilities as they are defined in ERISA §§ 404 and
406). Professor Stabile pays specific attention to the two types of prohibited
transactions under § 406. Id.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2000). The requirement for diversification
originates from the common law of trusts.
See supra note 31 and
accompanying text (discussing diversification as addressed by the UNIF.
PRUDENT INv. ACT and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS).

35. Chen, supra note 7, at C1. Diversification is where many trustees fail
because of inadequate investment knowledge, or because they are unaware
that they are legally responsible for the sufficient diversification of the plan.
Id. In Enron's case, plan participants had invested their savings primarily in
Enron stock, which led to huge losses when Enron stock price fell. Id.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(b) (2000).
37. These are the standards of prudence and the standard to act solely in
the interest of the plan as addressed by Professor Stabile, supra note 15, at
361 n1.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2000). When a pension plan fiduciary engages in
prohibited transactions, she can be held personally liable subject to the
guidelines established under ERISA section 502. Id. § 1109. One example of a
prohibited transaction is the extension of credit from the pension plan to the
employer; another example is not making effort to collect delinquent
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categories.3 9 The first category includes transactions between
fiduciaries and the plan that indicate self-dealing. 40 The statute
mandates that a fiduciary shall not
(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own
account, (2) in his individual or in any other capacity act in any
transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party... whose
interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of
its participants or beneficiaries, or (3) receive any consideration for
his own personal account from any party dealing with such plan in
41
connection with a transaction involving the assets of the plan.

The second category includes transactions between the
pension plan and parties-in-interest 42 to the plan. 43 These types of
prohibited transactions may range from the "sale or exchange, or
leasing of any property, between the plan and a party in interest"
44
to the "furnishing of goods, [and] services."
Section 409(a) of ERISA establishes liability for violation of
sections 404 and 406 of the statute. 45 Specifically, the statute
prescribes that any fiduciary "who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries...
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to
the plan resulting from each such breach." 46 Fiduciaries may be
subject to case-specific liabilities, including removal from the
position they held at the time of the breach. 47 The actual

contributions to the plan. Liss v. Smith, 991 F. Supp. 278, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y.
1998). See also Stabile, supra note 33, at 148-49 (elaborating on the statutory
relationship between ERISA §§ 406 and 502).
39. Stabile, supra note 33, at 139.
40. Id.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (2000). Some courts have held that prohibited
transaction claims under § 406 cannot be made independently from a general
fiduciary breach claim. Castaneda v. Baldan, 961 F. Supp. 1350, 1356-57
(S.D. Cal. 1997).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (2000).
A party in interest to an employee
retirement plan can be "any fiduciary... counsel or employee of such
employee benefit plan; ... a person providing service to such plan; [or] ... an
employee organization any of whose members are covered by such plan ......
Id.
43. Stabile, supranote 33, at 139.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (2000).
45. Id. § 1109(a).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 1111(a). The statute identifies people who have committed certain
crimes ranging from robbery to crimes involving abuse of position leading to
"illegal gain at the expense of the members of the labor organization or the
beneficiaries of the employee benefit plan." Id. § 1111(b). Penalties can be
severe, with a maximum of five years imprisonment or fines up to $10,000. Id.
§ 1105. Additionally, ERISA § 405 imposes liability on fiduciaries for breach
by a co-fiduciary. Id.
See also Stabile, supra note 33, at 140 (discussing
different scenarios that fall under 29 U.S.C. § 1105, such as when "a fiduciary
knowingly participates in a breach by another fiduciary, enables another
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enforcement provisions for criminal and civil fiduciary breach are
48
contained in sections 501 and 502, respectively.
The application of ERISA's broad powers was exemplified in a
recent United States Supreme Court decision, Varity Corporation
v. Howe.49 In Varity, the Supreme Court upheld an Eighth Circuit
ruling that Varity had breached its fiduciary obligations to the
beneficiaries of its retirement plan because it failed to administer
the plan solely in the interest of the beneficiaries. 50 The Court
held that Varity, which was both an employer and a plan
administrator,
acted
as
a
fiduciary
when
it
made
misrepresentations regarding its employee benefits plan to the
plan participants.51 The Court further held that Varity breached
its fiduciary duty to act solely in the interest of the plan
beneficiaries.5 2 Varity had reassured the participants that their
funds would be secure if they transferred them to a newly
incorporated Varity subsidiary, when, in fact, the new entity was
53
experiencing serious financial difficulties.
Although cases like Varity (where the trustees knowingly
misled plan participants) do occasionally occur, 54 it is much more
common to encounter lawsuits arising out of allegations that plan
trustees are completely or partially unqualified to fulfill their
duties as fiduciaries. 55 This type of fiduciary breach is often due to
the trustee's lack of investment knowledge, which (in cases with
smaller plans) is sometimes exhibited on a rather elementary

fiduciary to commit a fiduciary breach by his own failure to live up to his
fiduciary responsibilities or fails to make reasonable efforts to remedy a
breach by another fiduciary....").
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1132 (2000). The first part of the statute, subsection
502(a), establishes who has standing to sue for alleged fiduciary violations. Id.
§ 1132(a). The statute "empower[s]" plan participants, beneficiaries, and even
other fiduciaries to sue. Id. The following subsections deal with specific
situations such as delinquent contributions, and a fiduciary's failure to supply
requested information or to provide an annual report. Id. § 1132 (b)-(c).
49. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 489.
50. Id. at 491.
51. Id. at 498. The Court agreed with the District Court that "Varity was
wearing its 'fiduciary,' as well as its 'employer,' hat." Id.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000).
53. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 493-94. In fact, as the lower court established,
the subsidiary was insolvent from the very beginning. Id. at 494. The ERISA
fiduciary duty includes the common-law duty of loyalty. Id. at 506.
54. Susan J. Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan Investments in Employer
Securities, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 559-61 (2002). Professor Stabile
discusses allegations that Enron fiduciaries knowingly withheld key
information regarding the company's financial health from plan participants.
Id. at 559-60. The author also discusses a situation at Lucent Technologies in
which participants alleged that "executives tried to persuade company
employees to invest their plan assets in company stock, even though they
knew the company was in a serious financial trouble." Id. at 560-61.
55. Chen, supra note 7, at C1.
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analyze

the

detrimental effects to retirement plans caused by plan trustees'
lack of knowledge and expertise.
II.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL

PROBLEMS
OF PENSION PLAN TRUSTEE PERFORMANCE.

Many present day trustees, especially those in charge of
smaller plans, are part-time volunteers 57 with full-time
responsibilities5 8 that directly affect the lives of millions of plan
participants. 59 The first part of this Comment may have created
the impression that a trustees' task is not incredibly challenging:
trustees simply have to act reasonably and loyally to the plan and
its participants. 60 How then is it possible that so often pension
61
plan trustees find themselves in fiduciary breach?
To answer this question, this Comment will identify and
analyze some frequently litigated areas of trustee fiduciary breach.
This part of the Comment will also consider what steps must be
taken to prepare fiduciaries to meet their responsibilities more
adequately.
63
Acting prudently 62 and for the sole interest of the plan
56. See id. (giving an example of a trustee at a well-known bank who "didn't
know the difference between the S&P 500 and the Fortune 500"). See also
Liss, 991 F. Supp. at 289-303 (describing various allegations against pension
plan trustees).
57. Chen, supra note 7, at C1. The author points out that trustees are
elected not according to their expertise in investment and finance, but
according to their popularity within the organization. Id.
58. See Jefferson, supra note 14, at 621-22 (discussing the origins of
trustees' duties and the "prudent man standard" under the common law of
trusts). After the adoption of ERISA in 1974, common trust law became the
starting point for more specified duties. Id. at 621. Although ERISA focuses
on fiduciary duties in general, a corresponding regulation specifies that
trustees, with certain limited exceptions, "shall have exclusive authority and
discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan."
29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.403a-1(c) (2002). Trustees have a high level of responsibility as plan
fiduciaries, and therefore must observe investment duties as specified under
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2003).
59. Stabile, supra note 54, at 545 n.27. The author cites a number of
authorities to show the growth of assets in 401(k) plans, specifically showing
that at present, 401(k) plans have about $2 trillion in assets and cover more
than 42 million participants. Id.
60. See Medill, supra note 9, at 476 (discussing the duties of loyalty and
diversification).
61. See id. (warning of a possible wave of fiduciary breach litigation in the
near future, due largely to the existence of many under-funded plans).
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000) (establishing the general fiduciary duties
of prudence and diligence). See also Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 496 (mentioning
that in enacting ERISA, Congress did not specifically enumerate trustee
duties, but relied on the common law of trusts).
63. Medill, supra note 9, at 500.

2004]

Keeping Employees' Trust

requires more than what ERISA section 1104(a) suggests on its
face. In fact, trustee duties under ERISA are not only numerous,
but they are also, as the Second Circuit stated, "the highest known
to the law."64 Some trustee responsibilities include the duties to
investigate fund investments, diversify the plan's investments,
adhere to investment policy statements, monitor pension plan
solvency, and actively oversee the work of the plan's investment
65
advisor.
A. Duty to Investigate Investments
Statutory language 66 and court decisions have established
that trustees have a duty to investigate the safety of plan
investments. 67 Common trust law and ERISA section 404 provide
68
that trustees should act according to a standard of prudence.
The Third Circuit in its recent decision, In Re Unisys Savings
Plan, noted that, apart from the duty to diversify, 69 the standard
of prudence requires trustees to exercise due care 70 in their
dealings with the plan. One of the central elements of due care,
the court pointed out, requires that trustees must "investigate the
safety of the investment and its potential for income by securing
reliable information" and consulting with qualified experts.7 1 The
opinion of the Eight Circuit in Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co.
defined similar trustee requirements, 72 stating that the prudent
person requirement necessitates that the trustee investigate the
73
safety of the plan's investments.
Liss v. Smith exemplifies the harsh consequences of failing to
investigate investment decisions.7 4
In Liss, defendant plan
trustees had to respond to a large number of allegations 75 based

64. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982).
65. See Liss, 991 F. Supp. at 291-303 (addressing a number of grounds for
trustee fiduciary breach, such as failure to collect delinquent contributions,
failure to follow investment policies and guidelines, failure to hire an
investment advisor, failure to investigate plan investments, and failure to
diversify plan assets).
66. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000) (explaining the duty to act as a prudent

person).
67. See Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir.
1994) (explaining the duty to investigate plan investments and to diversify
assets).
68. See In re Unisys Savings Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 434-45 (3d Cir. 1996)

(providing a thorough analysis of the prudent person standard under the
common law as well as under ERISA).

69. Id. at 434.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Roth, 16 F.3d at 915.
Id. at 917, 919.
Liss, 991 F. Supp. at 278.
Id. at 286. The main allegations were failure to collect delinquent plan
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on, as the court put, it, the trustees' "astounding naivet6
evidencing a lack of basic investment technique[] and
knowledge." 76 One of the trustees, it was alleged, failed to
77
investigate or even inquire into the investment of plan assets.
The trustees relied blindly on their broker, investing, solely on his
word, up to twenty-five percent of the total plan assets at a time.78
The trustees also failed to inquire into the "merit, structure and
prudence of the various investments they made." 79 The Court
found that the trustees were in fiduciary breach, and specifically
80
emphasized that such behavior was "[p]articularly shocking."
B. Diversificationof Assets
Diversification of assets is another area with crucial
importance for plan performance; this issue has been the subject of
frequent litigation.81 Diversification of plan assets is expressly
required under the law.8 2 Failure to diversify is one of the most
83
common problems that pension plan trustees encounter.
Although the story of Enron is rather telling,8 4 it does not explain

contributions, lack of investment policy, failure to conduct independent
investigation into the safety of investments, and failure to use due care in
selecting a plan provider. Id. at 285-88. Common to all these claims was the
allegation that the trustees lacked "the requisite knowledge, experience and
expertise" to properly fulfill their duties. Id. at 297.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 298. The court noted that trustees made investments of
substantial portions of the plan assets "based solely on the advice of a broker,
whose credentials they never reviewed." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 299.
80. Id.
81. Stabile, supra note 54, at 539. The author examines the reasons for
401(k) plan over-investment in employer securities. Id. Some employees,
although aware of the dangers of lack of diversification, tend to invest in
employer stock because of their sense of loyalty to their company; other
employees have an-optimistic bias because they are overly confident that their
company will perform well; other reasons may be peer pressure at the
workplace or context-dependence (an employee is "context-dependent" if she is
limited and controlled in her investment decisions by the choices presented to
her). Id. at 547-52.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2000).
83. See Stabile, supra note 54, at 542-43 (discussing in detail the lack of
diversification in 401(k) plans due to over-investment in employer securities).
Professor Stabile points out that when 401(k) plans offer employer stock
options, eighty to ninety percent of the plan assets may be invested in
employer securities. Id. This high number is more predominant with lowwage workers who rely more heavily on their 401(k) plans as sources of
retirement income. Id.
84. Id. at 559-60. Because of its magnitude, the Enron debacle deserves
special attention.. Enron's retirement plans were an example of heavy
investment in employer securities. Id. According to Professor Stabile, of those
employees who had 401(k) plans, about sixty percent of the plan was invested
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why plan trustees repeatedly fail to follow this requirement. One
of the reasons for some trustees' failure in this regard is their lack
of adequate financial background, which often leads to
unjustifiably heavy investments in a single security.8 5 This
problem has persisted for some time, and has been addressed not
86
only by the courts, but also by legal commentators.
A telling example of over-investment is Brock v. Citizens
Bank of Clovis.8 7 In Brock, defendant plan trustees at a bank
received a warning from the Department of Labor that they were
in violation of ERISA's diversification requirement for investing
eighty-five percent of the plan assets in commercial real estate
mortgages.88 Trustees did not take any action, but claimed that
the investments were prudent and sufficiently diversified.8 9 The
Tenth Circuit held that the plan trustees had breached ERISA's
diversification requirement because the "trustees had chosen to
invest in 'one type of security,' which did not protect against a
multitude of risks." 90 Similarly, in Dardaganisv. Grace Capital
Inc., the Second Circuit held that section 404 of ERISA imposes on
trustees the specific duty to diversify investments in order to
minimize risks. 91 The court further noted that failure to meet the

in Enron stock. Id. While Enron stock was plummeting, many retirement
plan participants lost seventy to ninety percent of their retirement assets,
which for some participants amounted to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Id.
The situation was further aggravated by a freezing period during which
employees were prevented from switching out of company stock. Id. The huge
losses led to investigation by the Department of Labor, and class-action
lawsuits on behalf of plan participants. Id. Professor Stabile gives another
example of the lack of diversification presented by another well-known
business name, Lucent Technologies. Id. at 560-61. In Lucent's case, the
company stock fell more than ninety percent over a period of eighteen months.
Id. Many plan participants who were heavily invested in Lucent's stock lost
significant amounts of retirement assets. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Brock v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, 841 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1988).
88. Id. at 346.
89. Id.
90. Id.
See also Stabile, supra note 54, at 559 (describing Enron's
staggering losses, where some plan participants lost between seventy to ninety
percent of the value of their retirement accounts, which in some cases
translated into hundreds of thousands of dollars).
91. Dardaganis v. Grace Capital Inc., 889 F.2d 1237, 1242-43 (2d Cir. 1989).
Dardaganis involved a suit against an investment adviser hired by an
employee benefits plan, who failed to abide by the plan documents that set a
limit to common stock investments. Id. at 1239-42. Specifically, the plan
required that "[c]ommon stocks held shall not exceed 25% of the cost of the
securities in the Account." Id. at 1239. Over the next three years the
proportion periodically increased until it reached eighty percent, at which
point the investment advisor was fired by the plan. Id. The Court found the
investment advisor liable for failure to abide by the plan documents that
aimed to maintain a minimum level of asset diversification. Id. at 1243.
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diversification requirement results in fiduciary liability separate
92
from liability for imprudent actions.
C. Investment Advisors
ERISA does not explicitly require trustees to hire investment
advisors, 93 but court decisions indicate that hiring investment
advisors falls within the prudent person standard of care.
Katsaros v. Cody illustrates the importance of dealing with an
investment advisor. 94 In Katsaros, defendant plan trustees were
responsible for approving a loan for the purchase of land and a
gambling casino, 95 as well as for approving a loan to a bank, which
was soon thereafter closed by federal regulatory officials. 96 The
court removed the trustees from their positions and ordered them
to compensate the plan for the losses suffered.97 The court held
that because the trustees were "ill-equipped to evaluate the
soundness of the proposed loan" they had breached their fiduciary
duty by failing to procure outside assistance. 98 None of the
trustees had banking or accounting backgrounds, and they were
therefore wholly unprepared to analyze the financial information
presented to them. 99 The court went on to state that the trustees'
lack of investment knowledge and expertise was not an excuse
under an objective inquiry pursuant to ERISA. 1° ° The reason for
such a policy lies in the common law trust requirement that a
prudent person will be judged according to the standard of a
"prudent man ... familiar with such matters" and acting in a
similar capacity. 01' The court noted that the defendants had an
opportunity to use the services of an advisor who was well
10 2
equipped to evaluate the risk of the loans in question.

92. Id. at 1241. See also Liss, 991 F. Supp. at 301 (discussing plaintiffs'
suit against plan trustees for fiduciary breach alleging, among other things,

failure to diversify investments).
93. Liss, 991 F. Supp. at 296.
94. 744 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1984).

95. Id. at 274.
96. Id. at 275-76.
97. Id. at 280-82.
98. See id. at 279 (noting that trustees relied only on the borrower's
representations without considering another opinion as to the soundness of
the loan).
99. See Liss, 991 F. Supp at 296-97 (comparing the trustees' problems in
Katsaros to those presently alleged before the Court).
100. See Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 279 (citing Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n, 507
F. Supp. 378, 384 (D. Haw. 1980)).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
102. Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 279-80. For example, although the witness called
by the Government did not have pension plan management experience, the
issue was narrower: "namely whether a loan to a bank or bank holding
company was a prudent investment." Id. at 279. The Government's expert
"was fully qualified.., to testify on that basic issue and brought his expertise
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Courts have generally held that when a trustee lacks the
necessary education and expertise, the trustee has a duty to seek
independent advice.' 0 3 What is important, though, is that the
services of an independent advisor or an expert do not shield the
trustee from liability.10 4 The law designates the trustee as the
person who has to make the final decision based on pertinent
information and outside advice. 105
It is evident that an
uneducated trustee would not be' able to evaluate such advice
independently, but would have to blindly follow the advice of
others and hope for fortunate results. Such a situation puts the
plan's assets at risk, and is against the Congressional policy that
106
gave birth to ERISA as evidenced in 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
Retirement plan security should not depend upon the decisions of
07
ill-qualified trustees.
D. Investment Policy Statements
Another important area of trustee litigation is compliance
with written investment policy statements. This aspect of trustee
responsibility is closely related to diversification, in that trustees
have a fiduciary responsibility to comply with written investment
statements in the process of overseeing the plan.108 The relevant
to bear through his analyses based on generally accepted ratios such as
profitability, adequacy of capital, and liquidity." Id. at 279-80.
103. United States v. Mason Tenders, 909 F. Supp. 882, 886-87 (S.D.N.Y.
1995). The suit against two pension plan trustees alleged fiduciary breach in
the purchase of two pieces of real estate property. Id. at 886. The facts
establish that the trustees paid $24 million for a piece of property, "which was
$16.5 [million] more that the seller had paid for the building less than ten
months earlier." Id. at 884. Additionally, the plaintiffs allege that less than a
year after the $24 million purchase, an independent comprehensive analysis
showed that the building was worth only $5 million. Id. at 887. The building
was in fact worth $5 million only after the fund had spent a substantial
amount of money for renovations. Id. The court found fiduciary breach
because the trustees never obtained an appraisal as required by the plan
insurance policy. Id. at 888. The trustees also failed to engage in an
independent investigation and evaluation of the soundness of the investment.
Id. at 886-88.
104. Mason Tenders, 909 F. Supp. at 886-87.
105. Id. The court specifically stated that "[w]hile a trustee has a duty to
seek independent advice where he lacks the requisite education, expertise and
skill, the trustee, nevertheless, must make his own decision based on that
advice." Id.
106. Stabile, supra note 15, at 362. The main goal behind ERISA § 1001(a)
is to protect the pension plans and decrease the possible risk of losses. Id.
107. Id. at 366-68. Some of the original concerns were to protect retirement
plans from employer overreaching and abuse. Id.
108. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(2) (2002). The Code of Federal Regulations states
that "the maintenance by an employee benefit plan of a statement of
investment policy designed to further the purposes of the plan and its funding
policy is consistent with the fiduciary obligations set forth in ERISA section
404(a)(1)(A) and (B)." Id.
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statutory language under 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(2) states that
working in accordance with an investment policy statement is
"consistent" with ERISA's fiduciary obligations. 10 9 The court in
Liss relied on that language to find the plan trustees liable for
fiduciary breach due to the lack of an investment policy
statement. 110
Current statutory language supports the requirement that
The Federal
trustees understand investient dynamics.
Regulations state that investment policy statements are written
documents that provide the plan fiduciaries with guidelines and
instructions "concerning various types or categories of investment
management decisions." ' It is clear from this language that plan
trustees must have at least a basic understanding of investments
of
in order to be able to follow the guidelines for implementation
11 2
the different types of investment management decisions.
What is characteristic of the above-enumerated areas of
trustee fiduciary breach is that the violations might have been
avoided if the fiduciaries were adequately educated and skilled in
fulfilling their responsibilities.11 3 Better education would result in
better performance of the retirement funds, and would also
significantly limit trustee liability for possible breach. What is
important is the underlying policy of the prudent person standard,
which is concerned with the soundness of the decision making
process, and not necessarily the outcome of the decision in
question. 114 As the Eighth Circuit noted, citing Katsaros, "the
prudent person standard is not concerned with results; rather it is
a test of how the fiduciary acted." 11 5 The trustee is not, under this
standard, evaluated with hindsight; the trustee is evaluated from
1 6
the point in time when the decision was made.
The fact that trustees' imprudent actions may not result in a
financial loss for a plan thus does not always protect trustees from
liability.1 17 The Seventh Circuit addressed this issue in Brock v.
Robbins.118 In Brock, the plan trustees entered into a contract
with a service provider, agreeing to pay ten million dollars after
less than ten minutes of discussion. 1 9 The trustees never

109. Id.
110. Liss, 991 F. Supp. at 296. The Court held that absence of an
investment policy statement "coupled with the other acts and omissions by the
trustees of these Funds, constituted a breach of fiduciary duty." Id.
111. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(2) (2002).
112. Liss, 991 F. Supp. at 296-97.
113. Id.
114. Roth, 16 F.3d at 917-18.
115. Id. (citing Katsaros,744 F.2d at 279).
116. Id.
117. Brock v. Robbins, 830 F.2d 640, 648 (7th Cir. 1987).
118. Id. at 640.
119. Id. at 648.
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evaluated the soundness of the contract. 120 The Seventh Circuit
found that the plan trustees violated the prudent man standard
and awarded injunctive relief despite the fact that the plan did not
suffer any losses. 121 The court reasoned that "if the Secretary can
prove to a court that certain trustees have acted imprudently, even
if there is no monetary loss as a result of the imprudence, then the
interests of ERISA are furthered by entering appropriate
injunctive relief."1 22 By allowing for this sort of liability, courts
can deter potentially imprudent but honest trustees from engaging
1 23
in transactions that can be harmful to retirement plans.
Considering the reasons behind the frequent suits for trustee
fiduciary breach, it is evident that trustee incompetence, especially
in smaller pension plans, plays a major role in the litigation
Providing trustees with higher levels of
against trustees.
expertise and sufficient information would benefit plan
performance, and would cut down on the number of lawsuits
involving these trustees.
II. IN NEED OF EDUCATION: THE SAME EFFORTS
IN A NEW DIRECTION

One potential solution to the problem of trustee
responsibilities and expertise is providing trustees with adequate
Some commentators have discussed
investment education.
investment education in connection with the inadequate
diversification of defined contribution plans, and more specifically,
401(k) plans. 124 In that respect, the idea of education for the
individual investor as a decision-maker who is in control of the
funds is not a novel one. 125 What commentators agree on is that
"investment education to employees should be encouraged."' 26 At
the same time, some have conceded that investment education is
unlikely to affect the "employees' decisions with respect to
27
investment."

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 647.
123. Id.
124. Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities:
More Is Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 85-86 (1998).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 86. See also Stabile, supra note 15, at 375 (noting that although
regulations do not require an employer to provide investment education,
employers have "recognized the desirability of providing some type of
education to employees" who exercise primary control over the investments in
their accounts). Professor Stabile also emphasizes that although employers
try to provide investment education, they are cautious not to provide
information that may amount to investment advice that carries the burden of
fiduciary duty. Id.
127. Stabile, supra note 124, at 86.

The John Marshall Law Review

[37:903

One possible explanation for the lack of success of employee
education with respect to plan diversification is the effect of
128
context-dependence on the process of investment selection.
Professor Stabile argues that plan participant investment choices
in defined contribution plans, and specifically 401(k) plans, are
largely affected .by the number of choices presented, by the way
these choices are presented, and by the nature of the choices
themselves. 129 In this respect, plan participants "making decisions
in 401(k) plans do not, in fact, exercise meaningful control because
130
of the influence exerted by employers and other fiduciaries."'
Therefore, the ultimate decision-maker is not the plan participant,
but the employer or the plan trustee who provides the different
3
investment choices.' '
Defined benefit plans, on the other hand, do not allow plan
participants the broader decision-making powers characteristic of
defined contribution plans. 32 The issue of context-dependence
128. Stabile, supra note 15, at 378. The theory of context-dependence
focuses on the behavior of a decision-maker and on the relationship between
her and a particular choice in the presence of a number of alternative choices.
Id. As Professor Stabile explains, according to classical choice theory the
rational decision-maker will choose the alternative with the "highest value to
her." Id. See also Muir, supra note 12, at 11-13 (noting the work of behavioral
economists who recognize that investors do not always act in rational
consideration of objective economic factors). Instead people very often rely on
"heuristics to solve problems." Id. at 11. To demonstrate plan allocation
choices, the author presents an experiment conducted by two economists,
Professors Benartzi and Thaler. Id. at 12-13. The experiment involved two
groups of employees enrolled in a benefit plan who were "asked to allocate
their retirement contributions between stocks and bonds." Id. Both groups
were given identical information on historical equity premiums, but the
information was presented differently. Id. The results indicated that the
investment decisions of the two groups differed depending on the way the
information was presented. Id. "Two groups received charts showing the
distribution of annual rates of return on a thirty-year investment." Id. The
other group "received charts showing actual distribution of historic returns in
one-year increments." Muir, supra note 12, at 12-13. The results showed a
statistically significant difference. Id. The group that received the charts of
distribution of one-year incremental rates invested less in equity securities
than the other test group. Id.
129. Stabile, supra note 15, at 380-81. Professor Stabile offered an example
in which "requiring company matching contributions to be invested in
employer securities causes participants to direct a higher percentage of their
self-directed funds there as well." Id. Observers refer to this phenomenon as
the so-called endorsement effect, where "a participant interprets matches in
employer securities as 'as an endorsement or as implicit investment advice."'
Id.
130. Id. at 386.
131. Id.
132. See Jefferson, supra note 14, at 610-12 (explaining that, under ERISA,
the investment risk in defined benefit plans is placed on the employer and the
trustees of the plan who are responsible for the investment decisions, and
therefore for the ultimate plan performance).
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does not exist in defined benefit plans because the plan trustees'
control over the investment strategy of the plan is much more

direct. 133
It follows that in both defined benefit plans and defined
contribution plans, plan fiduciaries and trustees tend to be the
ultimate decision-makers. 3 4 At the same time, Part II of this
Comment examined various incidents of litigation based on
trustees' fiduciary breach with respect to smaller pension plans.
As discussed, many of the problems arise, in the words of the
Department of Labor, because "the responsible plan fiduciary
either does not understand his role and responsibility in the
selection and monitoring of service providers or exercises poor
judgment because he does not have experience or an appropriate
source of information concerning legal requirements and industry
35
practices."1
What is missing from ERISA's requirements is a different
direction of investment education. Education should be targeted
towards the ultimate decision-maker. 136 Higher standards of
fiduciary awareness and expertise should be required from plan
trustees who have ultimate control over the investment process,
and who also control the choices provided to plan participants in
137
the form of defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
These goals may be achieved by targeted legislative amendments
to ERISA, which the remainder of this Comment will describe.
What are the possible ways to better educate present and
future plan trustees, especially trustees serving smaller plans?
One possible solution may be to require individuals who assume
positions as plan trustees to pass a minimum proficiency test.
Such an approach may be helpful, especially with smaller plans
where trustees are often volunteers whose investment knowledge

133. Id.
134. See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text (discussing the various
degrees of investment control by plan fiduciaries).
135. Medill, supra note 9, at 490. One of the reasons why major employers
and their pension plans do not encounter problems with service providers as
often as smaller plans is that large employers often have sufficient resources
to procure a number of in-house experts who can carefully select investment
service providers. Id. at 489.
136. See Stabile, supra note 15, at 378-91 (explaining that participants in
benefit plans may not always have control over those plans). The theory of
context-dependence is at the center of the author's argument. Id. at 378-86.
Even though 401(k) plan participants are supposed to act with knowledge and
are believed to have full control over their investment decisions, their choices
are to a large degree influenced, sometimes even manipulated, by the choices
presented by their employers or the plan fiduciaries. Id.
137. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (discussing the position
of plan fiduciaries and their control over the investment decisions in defined
benefit and defined contribution plans).
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may be no different than that of the plan participants. 138
Financial service providers require various certifications for their
employees. 139 Similarly, plan trustees who deal with investment
advisors, and pension plan providers in general, should be able to
converse in the language of their partners in the financial
industry.
It can be argued that the requirement of some type of
licensing or certification may increase the cost of administering
the plan, which may deter smaller employers from providing such
licensing or from offering plans served by licensed trustees. At the
same time, however, employers should understand that with
fiduciary lawsuits on the rise, 140 the cost of plan insurance may
increase substantially.1 4 1
The higher cost of plan insurance,
together with the increased risk of lawsuits resulting in liability
for plan trustees, should be a sufficient incentive to accept the
small additional expense associated with licensing exams.
Another solution with broader application is the modification
of section 404(c) of ERISA.142 Limiting the protection of ERISA's
138. See Chen, supra note 7, at Cl (explaining that some trustees are not
aware of their duties and responsibilities).
139. Detailed information about the NASD and its corporate structure and
profile is available at http://www.nasdr.com/2220.asp (last visited Feb. 13,
2004). The various types of licensing exams are administered by the NASD
pursuant to the 1938 Maloney Act amendment of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934. Id. NASD regulates the operations of the Nasdaq Stock Market,
Inc. as well as the activities of more than 5,000 securities firms around the
country. Id. All securities professionals willing to work for NASD-member
firms must pass various examinations, administered by NASD, to demonstrate
a sufficient level of competency in their intended field of employment. Id.
Candidates are examined on subjects such as federal securities laws, SEC
rules and regulations, the operation and interpretation of financial markets,
and securities products and corporate financing. Id.
140. See Medill, supra note 9, at 470 (noting that as baby boomers age and
begin to retire, a wave of litigation may result from their dissatisfaction with
the performance of their pension plans). See Enron, 404(c) and the Personal
Liability for CorporateOfficers, available at http://www.reish.com (copy on file
with the author) (noting that the cost of fiduciary breach insurance is already
on the rise, and if fiduciary litigation were to continue "it is almost certain
that the premium costs for fiduciary insurance will increase significantly").
141. Enron,supra note 140.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(C) (2000). Section 404(c) has been increasingly
popular because it protects the employer from fiduciary liability arising from
the imprudent investment decisions of the plan participants. Employee
Benefits Practice, available at: http://www.reish.com (last visited Nov. 17,
2002). The statute provides in part that
[i]n case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and
permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in
his account, if a participant or beneficiary exercises control over the
assets in his account.. .(A) such participant or beneficiary shall not be
deemed to be a fiduciary by reason of such exercise, and (B) no person
who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under this part for any loss,
or by reason of any breach, which results from such participant's or
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safe harbor provision would raise the performance bar for plan
fiduciaries and would require a higher level of vigilance and
expertise. 143 With lesser protection from 404(c), employers will
have to ensure the adequate performance of the pension fund if
they are to protect themselves from possible suit for fiduciary
breach.144
Additional support for narrowing the scope of 404(c) is
available in the theory of context-dependence, which provides that
plan participants are under the influence of the range and type of
choices provided by the employer and the plan fiduciaries. 145 That
finding, combined with the view that many plan trustees
overseeing smaller plans do not perform adequately, 146 supports
the idea that the limitation of 404(c) may, in fact, improve the
performance of pension plan trustees.
III. CONCLUSION
Drawing from its origins in the common law of trusts, ERISA
requires pension plan trustees to act with prudence and
diligence 47 in exercising their duty to protect plan participants'
assets. 48 Many plan trustees, however, have been unable to meet
this demanding legal responsibility. 49 As a result, plan trustees'
inadequate
performance
has
led
not only
to
plan
underperformance, but also to multiple lawsuits for fiduciary

breach. 150
Theory and practice show that any type of educational efforts
should be directed towards the ultimate decision-makers in the
investment of pension funds. Plan trustees, as these ultimate
decision-makers, should be the true targets of educational efforts
15
for higher standards of performance.
beneficiary's exercise of control.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2000).
143. Employee Benefits Practice,supranote 142.
144. Id.
145. Stabile, supra note 15, at 364.
146. See generally Chen, supra note 7, at C1 (noting that allegations of
trustees' fiduciary breach are not limited to small plans, and that 401(k) plan
trustees have been under increasing scrutiny). See also Liss, 991 F. Supp. at
296-97 (providing an example in which plan trustees were held liable for a
number of violations ranging from a failure to hire an investment advisor to
the failure to properly investigate the plan investments).
147. 29 U.S.C § 1104(a) (2000). ERISA requires a fiduciary to exercise her
duties "with care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity.., would use .... " Id.
148. Stabile, supra note 15, at 366.
149. See Chen, supra note 7, at C1 (describing various instances of fiduciary
breach predicated on the plan trustee's inadequate performance).
150. Id. at C15
151. Stabile, supra note 15, at 364. The author's argument is that
behavioral theory and context-dependence provide support for the proposition
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The implementation of minimum level licensing exams will
result in overall higher standards of performance for trustees, with
benefits that would outweigh any incidental implementation costs
for the plan. That result can be further boosted by narrowing the
scope of section 404(c), which often fails to protect trustees, and
codifies the illusory impression that defined contribution plan
participants are solely responsible for their investment

decisions. 152

that with respect to 401(k) and other defined contribution plans, plan
participants are subject to influence and even manipulation by the plan
fiduciaries. Id.
152. Id. at 398.

